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ABSTRACT
We analyze employment and capital adjustments using plant data from the Colombian Annual Manufacturing
Survey. We estimate adjustment functions for capital and labor as a non-linear function of the gaps
between desired and actual factor levels, allowing for interdependence in adjustments of the two factors.
In addition to non-linear employment and capital adjustments in response to market fundamentals,
we find that capital shortages reduce hiring and labor surpluses reduce capital shedding. We also find
that after factor market deregulation in Colombia in 1991, factor adjustment hazards increased on the
job destruction and capital formation margins. Finally, we find that completely eliminating frictions
in factor adjustment would yield a substantial increase in aggregate productivity through improved
allocative efficiency. Yet, the actual impact of the Colombian deregulation on aggregate productivity
through factor adjustment was modest.
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1 Introduction
Well-functioning market economies require producers to change their input mix in response
to shocks. However, there is limited scope for continual adjustment of the main factors of
production, i.e., capital and labor. Instead, there is evidence that changes in investment
and employment are associated with substantial adjustments rather than frequent tinker-
ing (e.g., Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power
(1999), Doms and Dunne (1998), Gelos and Isgut (2001), Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003)
and Gourio and Kashyap (2007)). One explanation of these ﬁndings is that when ﬁrms face
ﬁxed adjustment costs and irreversibilities, it is only optimal to make large adjustments.
Factor adjustments have mainly been studied in the context of individual adjustment mar-
gins, and the few studies that analyze joint adjustments of capital and labor use sectoral
level data, thus assuming convex adjustment costs at the establishment level (Nadiri and
Rosen (1969), Shapiro (1986), Rossana (1990), and Hall (2004)).1
In this paper, we study the joint evolution of employment growth and investment using
panel data for Colombian manufacturing plants. In contrast to most previous studies using
micro data, our framework analyzes non-linear adjustment allowing for interactions between
the capital and labor margins. If factor demands are indeed inter-related, this implies
limited scope of piecemeal reforms. An interesting question in the context of developing
and transition economies is whether market reforms in these countries have been eﬀective
in increasing factor adjustments. In this paper, we focus on how inter-related labor and
capital adjustments changed after the introduction of market reforms in Colombia in the
early 1990s.
Colombia is an interesting case because, in the early 1990s, this country undertook
substantial market reforms, partly intended to liberalize labor and ﬁnancial markets and
to facilitate factor adjustments. Reforms introduced in 1990 and 1991 reduced dismissal
costs; liberalized deposit rates; eliminated credit subsidies; modernized capital market and
banking legislation; and removed restrictions on inﬂows of foreign direct investment. In
addition, Colombia has unique longitudinal microeconomic data on businesses with infor-
1Two exceptions, discussed in more detail below, are the studies by Polder, Pfann and Letterie (2004)
and Bloom (2007).
2mation on both plant-level quantities and prices for both outputs and inputs, which permits
to separately measure productivity, demand and cost shocks and to examine the impact
of these shocks on factor adjustments. This is an improvement over most of the existing
literature which measures productivity by deﬂating revenue by industry-level prices, likely
confounding productivity diﬀerences across plants with demand shifts or market power
variation within industries.2
Our paper makes a number of methodological innovations. First, we analyze inter-
related factor demands in the presence of non-linear adjustment functions, allowing us
to identify dynamic complementarities across factors. Second, our rich micro data con-
tains plant-level output and input prices, allowing us to estimate productivity and demand
shocks, which are used along with input price shocks to estimate desired factor demands.
Thus, a strength of our analysis is that we directly measure desired factor levels by esti-
mating the expressions resulting from the frictionless maximization problem rather than
having to rely on relationships between employment and hours and ﬁxed capital and energy
utilization, like other studies do.
We ﬁnd strong evidence of non-linear micro adjustments, as businesses adjust by a
greater amount when the gaps between desired and actual levels are larger. In addition,
we ﬁnd that frictions in capital and labor adjustments reinforce each other. Bigger capital
shortages reduce hiring and bigger labor surpluses reduce the shedding of capital. We also
ﬁnd evidence that the reforms increased labor adjustment, especially on the job destruction
side, as well as capital adjustment but only in response to relatively small shortages. By
contrast, plants became less responsive to capital surpluses. A potential explanation for this
is that the reforms may have induced a substitution away from capital destruction to job
destruction. One way of thinking about the latter is that the reforms may have increased the
relative importance of technology-related frictions relative to institutional frictions. In this
respect, we note that the adjustment function of capital after the Colombian reforms closely
mimics those estimated for the U.S., suggesting that the Colombian capital adjustments
may now be driven much more by technological and less by institutional factors as in the
U.S.
Finally, we take advantage of our ability to estimate physical productivity to examine
how the removal of frictions to adjustment aﬀects allocative eﬃciency. We ﬁnd that if
adjustment frictions could be completely eliminated there would be a substantial increase
in productivity. On the other hand, our counterfactual analysis reveals positive but modest
2One limitation of the AMS data is that plants do not report information on hours worked, so we use
information for hours at the sector-level.
3impacts of adjustment changes on aggregate productivity after the reforms.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe market deregulation in Colom-
bia in the nineties. In Section 3, we set up the building blocks for the estimation framework
of labor and capital adjustments under non-convex adjustment costs. In Section 4, we de-
scribe the data. In Section 5, we present evidence on non-linearities and interdependence
in factor adjustments in Colombia, and on the response of these adjustments after the
Colombian market reforms of 1990. In Section 6, we examine the eﬀects on productivity
due to increased reallocation from the removal of frictions in factor markets. We conclude
in Section 7.
2 Market Deregulation in Colombia
In the early 1990s, the government of President Cesar Gaviria introduced important reforms
to eliminate rigidities in factor and product markets. Law 50 of December 1990 introduced
severance payments savings accounts and reduced dismissal costs by between 60% and 80%
(see, e.g., Kugler (1999, 2005)). In 1993, Law 100 changed the social security system by
allowing voluntary transfers from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system with
individual accounts, while at the same time increasing contributions (see, e.g., Kugler and
Kugler (2009)).
Other reforms sought to reduce frictions in ﬁnancial markets. In 1990, Law 45 eliminated
interest rate ceilings as well as requirements to invest in government securities, and lowered
reserve requirements. At the same time, supervision of ﬁnancial markets was reinforced
in line with the Basle Accords for capitalization requirements. Law 9 of 1991 abolished
exchange controls, thus eliminating the monopoly of the central bank on foreign exchange
transactions and substantially reducing capital controls. Finally, Resolution 49 of 1991
eliminated restrictions to foreign direct investment. This resolution established national
treatment of foreign enterprises and eliminated limits on the transfer of proﬁts abroad
(see, e.g., Kugler (2006)). The policy change stimulated capital inﬂows and increased
competition in all sectors, but in particular in the ﬁnancial sector.
At the same time, the Gaviria government continued the reduction in tariﬀsi n i t i a t e db y
the preceding government. Eﬀective protection came down from 62.5% in 1990 to 26.6%
in 1991 (Edwards (2001)). In the late 1990s, the Samper government also made some
progress in the areas of privatization and tax reform, though reforms in these areas were
minor relative to those in factor markets and trade (Lora (2001)).
If factor market reforms achieved the goal of eliminating rigidities, we should observe
4changes in employment and capital adjustments after the reforms. In what follows, we
consider the dynamics of factor adjustments before and after the reforms (pre- and post-
1990), allowing for interdependence between employment growth and investment.
3 Theoretical Framework
This section explains the methodology we use to estimate adjustment hazards, as a function
of gaps between actual and desired levels of labor and capital, in the presence of either
convex or non-convex adjustment costs. In turn, we propose a framework for deriving the
desired factor demands, which are needed to estimate these factor gaps.
3.1 Inter-related Adjustment Costs
Following Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997) (CEH hereafter), our theoretical
framework is based on the observation that employment and capital are unlikely to equal
their desired levels when they are subject to adjustment costs, where such costs can be
related to regulations or technological frictions. In the presence of costs of adjusting em-
ployment and capital, thus, plant j will face expected employment and capital shortages,




















jt are the desired level of employment and capital and Ljt−1 and Kjt−1
are employment and capital levels after shocks have occurred but before the plant has ad-
justed. Desired levels are those the plant would choose if adjustment costs are momentarily
removed.
We deﬁne adjustment functions for employment and capital, Ajt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) and
Bjt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)), as the fraction of the respective expected shortage that is actually
adjusted, and model them as a function of E(Zjt) and E(Xjt). That is, deﬁning the actual
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the adjustment functions Ajt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) and Bjt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)), which are also called








The shapes of adjustment functions provide information about the nature of adjustment
costs.3 Employment and capital adjustment functions independent of the shortages would
be consistent with quadratic adjustment costs or a partial adjustment model. By contrast,
employment and capital adjustment functions that depend on E(Z) and E(X), respectively,
would be consistent with linear or lumpy adjustment costs or non-convexities (Caballero
and Engel (1993, 1999)). A key methodological contribution of our work is that we allow
the adjustment function of one factor to depend on the gap of the other factor.4 We
estimate parametric adjustment functions as follows:
Ajt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) = λ0 + λ1 [E(Zjt)]
2 + λ2E(Zjt) × E(Xjt)+λ3 [E(Xjt)]
2 ,
Bjt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) = κ0 + κ1 [E(Xjt)]
2 + κ2E(Zjt) × E(Xjt)+κ3 [E(Zjt)]
2 .
We modify this speciﬁcation to permit asymmetric responses to shortages and surpluses,
and to allow adjustments to vary between the pre- and post-reform periods. Since adjust-
ment functions are poorly deﬁned in the neighborhood of E(Zjt)=0and E(Xjt)=0 ,w e
3Cooper and Willis (2003) raise questions about the use of measures of the gap between desired and
actual factors to make structural inferences about the presence and magnitude of non-convexities. They
are concerned in part with the approximations of shortages made by CEH (1997) given data limitations.
In contrast to CEH, our results use a semi-reduced form speciﬁcation allowing actual factor adjustment,
of which we have direct measures for all factors, to be a non-linear function of fundamentals (TFP and
demand shocks). We are able to measure those fundamentals at the plant-level.
4The only two previous studies of joint factor adjustment using micro-data that we know of are Polder,
Pfann and Letterie (2004) and Bloom (2007). Polder et al. (2004) assume labor adjustment to be subject
to convex adjustment costs. Their estimates of labor adjustment costs are extremely high (in their view,
even implausibly high), leaving little room for interaction with capital adjustment. The paper by Bloom
(2007) provides a structural framework to jointly estimate adjustment costs of labor and capital. Since
our framework is semi-parametric, we are able to consider ﬂexible speciﬁcations that can be estimated
directly from the plant-level data. In contrast, Bloom (2007) uses simulated method of moments methods
with moments from a variety of sources. It would be interesting in future work to consider a structural
approach along the lines of Bloom (2007) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) for the issues explored in
this paper. One interesting aspect of the structural approach with indirect inference explored by Bloom
(2007) is to take into account time aggregation eﬀects. Here we are assuming the decision period is a year.
However, our approach is robust to aggregation of "zero" adjustment episodes not only over time but also
across production activities and types of capital, unlike structural approaches which rely on observation of
non-adjustment events.
6re-write the adjustment function deﬁnitions and estimate the following equations at the
micro-level with plant-level eﬀects:
4ljt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) = E(Zjt) × Ajt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) (3)
= E(Zjt) × [λ0 + λ1 [E(Zjt)]
2 + λ2E(Zjt) × E(Xjt)+λ3 [E(Xjt)]
2],
∆kjt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt)) = E(Xjt) × Bjt(E(Zjt),E(Xjt))
= E(Xjt) × [κ0 + κ1 [E(Xjt)]
2 + κ2E(Zjt) × E(Xjt)+κ3 [E(Zjt)]
2].
In the estimation, we weight the adjustment functions by establishment employment and
capital stock participation, respectively, to account for the greater importance of adjust-
ments of large relative to small plants in determining aggregate adjustment.
To estimate shortages and adjustment functions, we ﬁrst obtain the desired levels of
employment and capital. We begin by estimating frictionless levels of employment and
capital using the ﬁrst-order conditions of the plants’ static optimization problem, as de-
scribed below. Since these frictionless demands will diﬀer from the actual desired demands
because the latter arise when adjustment costs are removed only momentarily, we make an
adjustment assuming that desired demands are proportional to frictionless demands as in








where Ljt and Kjt are the frictionless demands of employment and capital, and θLj and
θKj are plant-speciﬁc employment and capital constants. We describe the estimation of
these plant-speciﬁc constants below.
3.2 Frictionless Proﬁt Maximization
We obtain frictionless levels of factor demands by solving the plants’ optimization problem









5Bertola and Caballero (1994) show how this assumption is consistent with proﬁt maximization in the
presence of adjustment costs.
7where Kjt is capital, Ljt is employment, Hjt are hours per worker, Ejt is energy use, Mjt
are materials, and Vjt is a productivity shock.





where Pjt is the output price and Djt is a demand shock and where −1
η is the inverse of
the elasticity of demand.
Finally, the ﬁrm faces competitive factor markets, where total labor costs, capital costs,










The wage function depends on the straight-time wage, w0t, as well as on the overtime
premium w1t.T h eﬁrm takes the user cost of capital, Rt, and energy and material prices,
PEt and PMt,a sg i v e n .
The ﬁrm maximizes frictionless proﬁts by choosing capital, employment, hours, energy
consumption, and materials, ignoring adjustment costs. The solution to the system of ﬁrst-
order conditions is given by a system of ﬁve equations that can be solved numerically in
terms of fundamentals (technology, demand, cost parameters, input prices, and shocks).6
As we describe below, the rich plant-level data permit us to estimate the fundamentals,
the frictionless demands and, in turn, the desired demands for capital and labor.
4 Estimation of Desired Factor Demands
To estimate the frictionless levels of employment and capital numerically, we need to obtain
the parameters, α, β, γ, φ, η,a n dδ as well as productivity and demand shocks, e Vjt and
e Djt, and input prices, e Rt, e w0t, and e w1t. We estimate factor elasticities (α, β, γ, φ)u s i n g
cost-shares calculated at the aggregate level.7 In turn, we use those estimates to calculate
6The full set of ﬁve equations is reported in the Methodological Web Appendix.
7We use aggregate cost-shares which enables us to easily consider a range of robustness checks including
estimation of IV-based factor elasticites (from Eslava et al. 2004), only available at the aggregate level.
However, results are robust to the use of sector-level factor elasticities obtained with a cost-shares approach.
When factor elasticities obtained with IV methods are used, results are also similar to those reported here.
See the Methodological Web Appendix for details.
8e Vjt as a residual from the (log) production function. Following Eslava et al. (2004), we then
estimate the inverse demand function, using e Vjt as an instrument, to obtain the demand
elasticity (η) and a measure of the demand shock, constructed as the (log) residual of the
demand estimation.8 For the estimations of factor and demand elasticities we need data
on production, factor use, and output prices at the plant level.
Our data come from the Colombian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) for the years
1982 to 1998. The AMS is an unbalanced panel of Colombian plants with more than 10
employees, or sales over US$35,000 in 1998. The AMS includes information on: the value of
output and average prices charged for each product manufactured; overall cost and average
prices paid for each material used in the production process; energy consumption in physical
units and average energy prices; production and non-production number of workers and
payroll; book values of equipment and structures; and 5-digit ISIC industry classiﬁcation
codes.9
We construct our measures of physical output and materials by dividing revenue and
material expenditures by plant-level output and materials deﬂators. By using plant-level
prices on output and materials, we eliminate a common source of measurement error in
productivity measures. Energy consumption is directly reported by the plant. We construct
the plant capital stock recursively using a perpetual inventory method. Finally, since the
AMS does not have data on hours, we construct a measure of hours per worker at time
t for sector G(j), by dividing sector earnings per worker from AMS data by a measure
of sectoral wages at the 3-digit level from the Monthly Manufacturing Survey, and then
deﬂating the nominal wage with the CPI.10
Since the AMS does not contain information on the user cost of capital and labor costs,
we collect information on these from additional sources. For the user cost of capital, e Rt,
the results we report use a constant value, 0.15, which is in the lower bound of previous
estimates for Colombia.11 The straight-time wage, e w0t, is a sector-level wage calculated
8Besides diﬀerences in market power, the residual from this inverse-demand regression may also capture
relative price shocks due to diﬀerences in product quality across plants. Quality diﬀerences are, thus, also
embedded in our measures of desired employment and capital stocks.
9See Eslava et al. (2004) for a more detailed description of the data.
10By using a sectoral wage index, we are attributing plant-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in wages from the sectoral
average to diﬀerences in labor quality at the plant.
11We tried other estimates of e Rt, both constant and variable, which yield similar results, although some
of them are less reliable. Since the user cost of capital used in our analysis was obtained with actual data
in the presence of frictions, we try a lower value of e Rt =0 .08 and ﬁnd the results are virtually identical. In
addition, we tried using the real interest rate instead of the user cost of capital estimated in previous studies
and the results for labor adjustments are similar but the capital adjustment hazard turns out negative for
9as explained above and the overtime premium, e w1t, is set to the legally required overtime
premium of 25% in Colombia. We use δ =2 , which is estimated for the U.S. by both Bils
(1987) and Cooper and Willis (2003).12
Given the parameters and shocks, we estimate desired demands for capital and labor as
follows.13 First, we solve numerically the full ﬁve equation system of frictionless ﬁrst-order
conditions for all factors, in terms of the fundamentals for each plant-year observation.
Second, we exploit identities derived from the ﬁrst-order conditions for the variable factors
(materials, energy and hours) with and without assuming frictions for variable factors.
These identities imply that frictionless demand for a factor is equal to actual demand for a
factor times the ratio of frictionless revenue to actual revenue. We use these identities and
our initial numerical solution to the system of ﬁrst order equations to generate measures of
t h ev a r i a b l ef a c t o r si nt h ef r i c t i o n l e s se n v i r o n m e n t . 14 Third, we express frictionless capital
and labor as functions of fundamentals and the frictionless variable factors (estimated as
just described). That is, we use the following relationships, obtained from the full system

































where e y denotes the natural logarithm of variable y.
As a ﬁnal step, we estimate the plant-speciﬁc constant factors of proportionality relating
frictionless to desired demands for capital and labor, as described above. Following CEH
(1995), we estimate the plant-speciﬁc constants using periods when desired capital and
labor are plausibly close to actual capital and labor. As described in the Methodological
Web Appendix, we consider a number of alternative ways of classifying such periods and
ﬁnd our results are robust to reasonable alternatives. For the baseline results reported in
the paper we estimate these plant-speciﬁc constants using the ratios between the actual
capital surpluses, suggesting that this measure introduces substantial measurement error. Details on these
robustness tests, as well as the corresponding results, are presented in the Methodological Web Appendix.
12We tried diﬀerent values of δ. For example, a higher value of δ =3suggests very similar results. See
the results in the Methodological Web Appendix.
13See the Methodological Web Appendix for a more detailed description.
14In this second step, we also include a constant plant-speciﬁc correction factor to allow for plant-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in the measurement error of frictionless revenue. The impact of these multiple steps
is modest. For example, the correlation between the ﬁrst step estimate of materials and the ﬁnal step
estimate of materials is 0.99.
10and the frictionless employment and capital levels for the year in which the plant is at its
median employment growth and investment, respectively.15
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of quantities and prices, weighted by output,
a n do fp r o d u c t i v i t ya n dd e m a n ds h o c k s ,f o rt he pre- and post-reform periods. Quantity
variables are expressed in logs and prices are relative to a yearly producer price index
to discount inﬂation. Output and factor use increased between the pre- and post-reform
periods. Relative prices of output and materials prices declined between the pre- and post-
reform periods, while energy prices and wages increased. Average productivity and the
dispersion of productivity went up during the reform period. While demand shocks fell
on average, their dispersion increased after the reforms. Both productivity and demand
shocks are very persistent, i.e., they have an AR(1) coeﬃcients of around 0.92 and 0.98.16
Table 1 also presents output-weighted ﬁrst and second moments of the distributions
of labor and capital shortages, which are used to estimate adjustment functions, for the
sample of pairwise continuers (i.e., all plants that are present in t−1 and t).17 Mean capital
shortages move closer to zero in the post-reform period, while mean labor shortages and
the standard deviations of both shortages do not change much between the two periods.
15When there is more than one year in which a plant is at its median growth, we calculate the mean
ratio between the actual and the frictionless levels of factor use for all such years. Our results are robust
to using the median of those ratios rather than using the mean. They are also robust to deﬁning θLj and
θKj not as ratios for the median adjustment year, but as the mean of ratios over a number of years closest
to the median adjustment, where the number of years used depends on the number of years a plant is
present in the sample. A more detailed description of robustness tests is included in the Methodological
Web Appendix.
16The persistence of TFP looks very similar if we use sector-level instead of plant-level prices. The
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of TFP calculated using sector-level prices is 0.9. The ﬁnding that persistence is
about the same whether one uses physical TFP as here or revenue TFP (with sectoral prices) is consistent
with the patterns of persistence found by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) for the U.S. Note
however the estimated persistence in Colombia is higher than that estimated for the U.S.. However, for
the U.S. demand shocks are estimated to have higher persistence than TFP, just as found here.
17We have also estimated our results using only a balanced panel. The results for the hazards and the
eﬀects of reforms are similar to those shown below, with the exception that nonlinear adjustment patterns
are even more pronounced. See Methodological Web Appendix.
115 Labor and Capital Adjustments
5.1 Adjustment Functions
Table 2 presents estimates of the weighted labor and capital adjustment functions (Columns
(1)-(6), and Columns (7)-(12), respectively). As a benchmark, we report results from a
standard partial adjustment model (PAM) , in which changes in labor and capital are in-
dependent of the magnitude and sign of shortages, so that establishments always close a
constant fraction of the gap. Comparing the results of this speciﬁcation in Columns (1)
and (7) to those of models that include own shortages in Columns (3) and (9) show that
the adjusted R2s increase from 0.1799 to 0.1958 for labor adjustment and from 0.2093 to
0.2647 for capital adjustment. The non-linear terms as well as the terms capturing asym-
metries for positive and negative shortages are not only economically but also individually
and jointly statistically signiﬁcant, with F-statistics of 410.05 and 1,560.05 for labor and
capital adjustments, respectively. A standard linear PAM speciﬁcation would, thus, miss
key aspects of the adjustment process captured by our ﬂexible non-linear and asymmetric
speciﬁcation.
Figures 1 and 2 show the weighted employment and capital adjustment hazards, each
as a function of the respective shortage (left scale). Figures 1 and 2 also show the fractions
of employment and of the capital stock for plants with diﬀerent shortages (right scale). We
focus attention on the region of shortage distributions where most plants are located, by
truncating these ﬁgures at shortages of -1.35 and 1.35.18 Figures 1 and 2 show highly non-
linear adjustments. The ﬁgures show that job creation and capital creation and destruction
increase as the magnitude of the shortages and surpluses increases.
Figures 1 and 2 also show that there are striking asymmetries between positive and
negative adjustments. Figure 1 shows that labor adjustment is a highly non-linear function
of the gap when faced with employment shortages, but less so when faced with surpluses.
This may be because one of the most important costs of separations are severance payments
imposed by regulations, which are per worker costs as opposed to ﬁxed costs. By contrast,
we ﬁnd strong non-linearities on both the capital creation and destruction sides. At the
same time, we ﬁnd clear evidence of irreversibilities for capital on the destruction side, as
capital shedding is much less likely than investment.
These results are consistent with the ﬁndings in CEH (1995, 1997) for the U.S. who ﬁnd
evidence of non-linear adjustment for capital and employment separately. Moreover, the
18About 96% of aggregate employment and 90% of the aggregate capital stock are concentrated in these
regions.
12ﬁnding of irreversibility in capital formation is consistent with the evidence by Caballero
and Engel (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) who ﬁnd that convex and non-
convex costs of adjusting, as well as irreversibilities, are all important components of capital
adjustment cost functions in the U.S.
Yet, our speciﬁcations are more general than those in previous studies, since we consider
joint adjustments of employment and capital, allowing us to study the eﬀects of capital
shortages on employment adjustment and of employment shortages on capital adjustment.
Comparing the standard non-linear model with non-linear models that include shortages
of the other factors suggests that interactions indeed matter. Results from models that
include cross-terms in Columns (5) and (11) show that the cross-terms are individually
as well as jointly signiﬁcant, with F-statistics of 33.59 and 205.7 for labor and capital,
respectively. The R2 also goes up relative to the standard PAM and non-linear models.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fc r o s s - e ﬀects is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The solid line shows the
adjustment function when the shortage of the other factor is set to zero, while the heavy
continuous/discontinuous dashed lines show the adjustment functions when the shortage
of the other factor is set to +/- one standard deviation. Figures 1 and 2 show that capi-
tal shortages reduce job creation, while labor surpluses reduce capital destruction. These
results suggest adjustment complementarities in the sense that frictions to adjusting one
margin reinforce frictions on the other margin.19 Also, note that not including interaction
eﬀects in the estimation (light dotted lines in both Figures) leads to somewhat ﬂatter esti-
mated hazards in job creation and capital destruction. However, the primary implication
of including interaction eﬀe c t si st h a ts u c he ﬀects yield interesting interactions and not so
much that the estimation of the own eﬀects are impacted by the inclusion of interaction
eﬀects.
Another advantage of our approach, compared to those of previous studies, is the use
of plant-level prices. Plant-level prices for outputs and inputs allow us to separate physical
productivity and demand shocks. Thus, the use of plant-level prices yields better measures
of fundamentals, which are needed to construct our measures of shortages and surpluses. We
have conducted an alternative analysis presuming we only had access to sector-level output,
energy, materials prices in the estimation of our fundamentals (see Methodological Web
Appendix for details). Using only sectoral-level prices, we obtain less precise estimates of
the adjustment hazards as well as patterns that are consistent with substantial measurement
error. For instance, we obtain negative capital adjustment hazards in the capital destruction
side, and a decreasing adjustment function in the creation side. Both patterns are consistent
19However, adjustment complementarities do not hold symmetrically over shortages or surpluses.
13with measurement error that induces mismeasurement of desired factors and, in turn,
factor adjustment gaps. In addition, we ﬁnd that employment and capital adjustment
hazards based on measures of fundamentals that do not use plant-level prices shift down
after reforms. Thus, the measurement error induced by using sectoral-level prices would
yield misleading inferences about the impact of reforms as well as about the shape of
the adjustment hazards.20 Moreover, if we had only had data on sectoral-level prices, it
would be impossible to undertake the analysis of changes in allocative eﬃciency reported
in Section 6.
5.2 Adjustments after Deregulation
The even-numbered Columns of Table 2 present results which allow for diﬀerential eﬀects
of the reforms in the PAM, the standard non-linear model and the non-linear model with
cross-terms. In all cases, the post-reform terms are jointly signiﬁcant. To better see the
role of reforms on adjustment dynamics, Figures 3 and 4 show employment and capital
adjustment hazards before and after reforms, as a function of the respective shortage.
Figure 3 shows that the job destruction hazard almost doubled after the labor market
reform of 1990. On the creation side, there is slightly less adjustment for small shortages
but more for large shortages. Non-linearities became more important on the job creation
and job destruction sides, suggesting that reforms increased the relative importance of
adjustment costs that yield nonlinearities (e.g., ﬁxed costs).
Figure 4 shows large diﬀerences in terms of the impact of reforms on the creation and
destruction of capital. There is less capital destruction after the reforms.21 By contrast, for
a broad range of values of capital shortages, the responsiveness of investment increases after
the reforms. Moreover, the eﬀect of reforms on investment is non-linear, as the adjustment
function becomes ﬂatter. Investment becomes less responsive to very large capital shortages
after the reforms, but this decreased ﬂexibility has little aggregate impact given that the
share of capital facing shortages above 1 is less than 10%.
The greater responsiveness of capital adjustment to shortages and the ﬂatter shape of
the adjustment function in this range are consistent with reforms reducing adjustment costs
of investment. However, less adjustment to capital surpluses after the reforms is at odds
20Without plant-level prices, we cannot estimate productivity and demand shocks, so we focus on a more
general proﬁtability shock, and we impose a given demand elasticity. Greater detail on how adjustment
functions were estimated in the absense of plant-level prices can be found in the Methodological Appendix.
21This ﬁnding is robust to using a measure of the user cost of capital that varies over time, or one that
is ﬁxed at a level below that of our basline results.See the Methodological Web Appendix.
14with the expectation of greater ﬂexibility in capital destruction. The greater irreversibility
may reﬂect a substitution towards job destruction and away from capital destruction. This
may be because reforms made it relatively cheaper to dismiss workers, so that after the
reforms ﬁrms used capital destruction less readily due to the presence of technological and
market barriers. In fact, the eﬀect of reforms in the shape of the adjustment function for
capital mirrors the eﬀect we obtain for the employment adjustment function. We also note
that the patterns of the capital adjustment functions after the reforms more closely mimic
those of the U.S. (see Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995)). One way of thinking about
the latter is that the reforms may have increased the relative importance of technology-
related frictions relative to institutional frictions. An open question for future research
is to identify precisely the institutional frictions that yielded the pre-reform patterns of
adjustment.
6 Factor Reallocation and Aggregate Productivity
In this section, we examine the potential productivity gains from removing frictions to factor
adjustment, and whether there were actual productivity gains associated with the changes
in labor and capital adjustments observed in Colombia after the reforms. In particular,
we measure changes in aggregate productivity due to changes in reallocation from the
reduction or removal of frictions in factor markets. We do this by conducting an Olley and
Pakes (1996) decomposition, which quantiﬁes what part of aggregate productivity every
year reﬂe c t st h ep r o d u c t i v i t yo ft h ea v e r a g ep l a n ta n dw h a tp a r tc a p t u r e st h ec o n c e n t r a t i o n
of activity in the more productive plants:









where TFPt is the aggregate total factor productivity measure for a given 3-digit man-
ufacturing sector in year t. These aggregate measures correspond to weighted averages
of our plant-level TFP measures, where the weights are market shares (calculated as de-
scribed below). The ﬁrst term of the decomposition, TFPt, is the average cross-sectional
(unweighted) mean of total factor productivity across all plants in that sector in year t.
TFPjt is the total factor productivity measure of plant j at time t estimated as described
in Section 5, fjt is the share or fraction of plant j0s output out of sectoral output at the
153-digit level in year t,a n dft is the cross-sectional unweighted mean of fjt for the sector.22
The second term in this decomposition allows us to understand whether production is
disproportionately located at high-productivity plants, and examining this decomposition
over time allows us to learn whether the cross-sectional allocation of activity changed in
response to market reforms.23
We estimate the actual decomposition of TFP and then we construct four counterfac-
tuals, which allow us to answer what would had been the cross-sectional allocation had
frictions in factor markets been removed altogether or, alternatively, had they been re-
duced to the post-reform levels. The decompositions only diﬀer from each other in the
shares used in the second term. The ﬁrst decomposition uses actual output shares. The
other decompositions use counter-factual output shares, where output is calculated as:











In each case, b Vjt is the exponential of our TFP measure. The levels c Mjt, b Ejt, b Hjt, b Kjt,a n d
b Ljt, however, vary across decompositions. For the second decomposition, c Mjt, b Ejt,, b Hjt,
b Kjt and b Ljt are the frictionless levels of these factors.24 For other decompositions, c Mjt,
b Ejt, and b Hjt are the observed levels, while b Kjt and b Ljt vary across the diﬀerent exercises.
For the third decomposition, b Kjt and b Ljt are the capital and employment levels that would
have resulted if labor and capital changed according to our estimated adjustment functions
in equation system (3), which vary between the pre- and post-reform periods. Finally,
for the last two decompositions, we construct counter-factual shares where b Ljt and b Kjt
are the employment and capital levels that would have prevailed if the labor and capital
adjustment functions, respectively, had remained the entire period as during the pre-reform
years.25
22The fact that we calculate aggregate measures at the sector level means that our focus is on within-
sector reallocation rather than between-sector reallocation, for sectors deﬁned at the 3-digit level. In the
results, we report averages of the 3-digit level results using time invariant industry average gross output
shares to aggregate across industries so our results don’t reﬂect changes in the industry composition over
time.
23An advantage of this cross-sectional method over methods that decompose changes in productivity
over time, is that cross-sectional diﬀerences in productivity are more persistent and less dominated by
measurement error or transitory shocks.
24For all counter-factuals, we estimate the levels of capital and labor, and thus their respective adjust-
ments, holding the demand shocks at their average level for each plant.
25The projected growth rates for the counterfactuals which use our estimated adjustment functions are
in the (-2, 2) range for all observations. This is an indication of good ﬁt of our adjustment functions.
16Figure 5 presents the results of these decompositions. The solid line corresponds to the
TFPt term (equal across the diﬀerent versions of the decomposition), while the other lines
represent the second term, named “cross-term” using shares from the diﬀerent measures of
output. The cross-term of the actual decomposition, represented by the dotted line, shows
that allocative eﬃciency improved after the introduction of reforms in 1991, increasing
aggregate productivity.
The thick grey line presents the cross-term of the frictionless decomposition, which
shows what productivity levels would have been had all frictions in factor adjustment been
removed. Comparing this line with the cross-term of the actual decomposition shows that
productivity would have been substantially higher in all years had all frictions from factor
markets been removed. The diﬀerence is quite large: the actual cross-term is between 20
and 25 log points lower than it would be in the absence of barriers to eﬃcient allocation.
This increase in productivity results because allowing plants to adjust labor and capital
more easily increases the market share of more productive plants and reduces the share of
less productive plants.
The remaining counter-factual decompositions allow answering whether the Colombian
reforms moved the economy in the direction of a frictionless environment. From Figure 5, it
is clear that the impact of reforms on aggregate productivity via reductions in adjustment
frictions is small. The cross-term is almost identical between the decomposition that uses
output projected by our adjustment function (in circles in the Figure) and those that use
output projected by keeping one or both of the adjustment functions at its pre-reform
level. However, as would be expected, the impact of the reduction in adjustment frictions
on productivity is positive.26
In interpreting the small contribution of the actual vs. potential reduction in adjustment
frictions, it is useful to return to Figures 3 and 4 (and Table 2) to note the magnitudes of the
actual changes in adjustment costs. We ﬁnd changes that are on the order of magnitude
of about a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of the gaps that are closed for
employment surpluses and capital shortages over ranges where most of the mass of the
distribution lies. Such changes are economically and statistically signiﬁcant but not large
either in the sense of eliminating adjustment frictions or going from a situation of virtually
no adjustment to substantially more rapid adjustment. The ﬁnding that removing all
26One concern in interpreting these decompositions is that the reforms apparently yielded less ﬂexibility
in terms of capital destruction which may be oﬀsetting the gains from greater ﬂexibility for labor and for
capital surpluses. However, one of our decompositions focuses only on the greater ﬂexibility of labor and
we still obtain modest eﬀects.
17frictions would substantially increase productivity suggests that in the presence of large
changes in the speed of adjustment we would observe a large increase in productivity from
improved allocative eﬃciency. However, the correct inference is apparently that notable
increases in productivity require large changes in the adjustment frictions.27
It is also interesting to note that the actual decomposition, the frictionless decomposi-
tion and all of the remaining counterfactual decompositions show a substantial improvement
in allocative eﬃciency following reforms. Thus, it does appear that reforms had an impact
on allocative eﬃciency, possibly through channels other than the reduction in the costs of
input reallocation. What might those other channels be? To consider this question, it
is useful to compare the ﬁndings in this section with the recent literature examining the
role of allocation distortions in accounting for productivity diﬀerences across countries and
over time. Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005), Eslava et al. (2004,
2006), Hsieh and Klenow (2006) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2006) all
explore the idea that distortions to output and factor allocation may underlie productivity
diﬀerences across countries and within countries over time.28 The working hypothesis from
this literature is that allocative distortions prevent resources from being deployed to their
highest valued use and this literature develops the underlying theory and related empirical
analysis to explore this hypothesis.
Our ﬁndings contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, given our ability
to measure frictionless optimal capital and labor using our measures of fundamentals (i.e.,
productivity, demand and cost shocks), our analysis provides a direct metric for evaluating
this hypothesis — that is, we are able to construct a measure of productivity associated with
establishments moving to their optimal frictionless capital and labor decisions and we ﬁnd
that such movements have substantial potential for improving productivity. Second, the
27Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1992) ﬁnd in their model calibration that eliminating adjustment costs in
labor from severance payments that amount to one year of wages would increase productivity via allocative
eﬃciency by about 2 percent. Our ﬁnding of an increase in productivity of 20 log points from elimination
of both capital and labor market adjustment costs is diﬃcult to compare directly to the Hopenhayn and
Rogerson ﬁnding but suggests considerably larger scope for productivity improvements from reducing
adjustment frictions.
28From a positive stance, Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) note that coexistence of high and low returns to
investment opportunities, together with the low average marginal product of capital, suggests the mis-
allocation of capital as a cause behind the low output per capita and capital per worker in developing
countries. They provide evidence on sources of misallocation of capital, including credit constraints, in-
stitutional failures, and others. They conclude that "combined with multiple technological options and a
ﬁxed cost of upgrading to better technologies, a model based on misallocation of capital does quite well in
terms of explaining the productivity gap."
18approach in this paper explores the view that the distortions to allocation from regulations
in part take the form of increased factor adjustment costs.29 Third, in this respect while
we show that the potential impact of removing all frictions is large, the actual reforms
in Colombia in terms of reducing capital and labor adjustment costs only had a modest
impact on improved allocative eﬃciency.30
In considering potential alternative sources of misallocation (i.e., not driven by factor
adjustment costs), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2006) list, among
others, local externalities, credit constraints, missing insurance markets and government
failures. They also emphasize that increases in competitive pressures from market reforms
provides less scope for the allocation of activity to be based on arbitrary and capricious fac-
tors. The widespread reforms discussed in Section 2 potentially reduced the misallocation
from a number of these sources. As such, our ﬁnding of improved allocative eﬃciency that
is apparently not driven by a reduction in factor adjustment costs is potentially driven by
amelioration of one of those other sources highlighted by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) and
Hsieh and Klenow (2006). Given the substantial gains in allocative eﬃciency over this
period in Colombia, identiﬁcation of the precise source of improvement is a promising area
for future research.31 We also note in closing this section that these alternative sources of
misallocation inherently yield more persistent misallocation relative to adjustment costs.
A lesson of our analysis is that given that distorted adjustment costs yield less persistent
misallocation it requires a very large change in the adjustment costs to have a notable
impact on productivity.
29Caballero et al. (2004) also consider improvements in allocative eﬃciency through reductions in ad-
justment costs.
30One impact of reforms that our current approach does not capture relative to this literature is that
the improvement in allocative eﬃciency may be due to which ﬁrms and establishments survive. Instead, in
this paper we focus on mitigating ineﬃciencies due to misallocation across continuing establishments. In
Eslava et al. (2004, 2006) we have explored the impact of reforms on market selection. In future work, we
plan to explore these two margins as well as the entry margin simultaneously.
31For example, it may be that trade reforms improved allocative eﬃciency as suggested in Eslava et
al. (2004). Note also that Figure 5 suggests an increase in within plant productivity over the 1980s
in a manner consistent with Fernandes (2007). Fernandes argues that the trade reforms over the 1980s
contributed to this within plant increase in productivity via increases in competitive pressures on existing
ﬁrms. However, our evidence which extends beyond the 1991 period analyzed by Fernandes shows that
within plant productivity did not increase over the course of the 1990s — a time period of continued trade
and other market reforms.
197C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine how plant-level adjustment dynamics for capital and labor inter-
act with each other. Given the widespread ﬁnding that plant-level adjustments are lumpy,
we allow for non-linear adjustment dynamics. Beyond considering the interaction of capital
and labor adjustments, we estimate adjustment dynamics in the context of an emerging
economy, namely Colombia, that has undergone a substantial reform process intended to
deregulate factor markets.
Our results can be brieﬂy summarized as follows. First, consistent with the existing
literature, we ﬁnd strong evidence of non-linear micro adjustments. Businesses are likely
to adjust capital and labor by a proportionally greater amount if the gaps between desired
and actual levels are large. Equivalently, we ﬁnd larger proportionate responses to large
TFP and demand and cost shocks than in response to small shocks. Second, we ﬁnd
important interactions between capital and labor adjustments. In particular, businesses
with capital shortages are less likely to create jobs in response to labor shortages, and
businesses with labor surpluses are less likely to shed capital when faced with capital
surpluses. These ﬁndings highlight the importance of jointly analyzing capital and labor
adjustments. In terms of policy, the evidence highlights a potentially undesirable feature
of piecemeal reform, namely that frictions in still regulated factor markets can distort
adjustment of a newly deregulated factor, thus hampering the eﬀectiveness of reform.
Our analysis shows that most of the ﬁndings with regards to labor and capital adjust-
ments would be missed if a standard linear partial adjustment model was used instead of
the more ﬂexible, non-linear, multivariate model. The linear partial adjustment model im-
plies only that labor ﬂexibility increases and capital ﬂexibility decreases after the reforms
and misses the asymmetries in labor and capital adjustments, as well as the asymmet-
ric responses of these adjustments to the reforms. We also ﬁnd that the availability of
plant-prices to be used both as deﬂators and to measure cost shocks faced by the plant
substantially reduces measurement error in the estimation of adjustment functions. Put
diﬀerently, if plant-level prices had not been available, the resulting estimates would have
yielded implausible results for the shape of the adjustment hazards, and misleading infer-
ences about the impact of reforms.
In terms of the impact of market reforms, the largest eﬀect we ﬁnd is the increased
ﬂexibility of labor, especially on the destruction side, and of investment. Interestingly, this
increase in labor ﬂexibility is accompanied by a signiﬁcant reduction in capital destruction.
Thus, while the reforms may have succeeded in making labor more ﬂexible in Colombia,
20contracting plants appear to have used that greater ﬂexibility of labor to reduce capital
adjustments. One possible explanation for this pattern is that the reduction in frictions
from the institutional reform may increase the importance of technology-related frictions.
Generally, technological frictions associated with labor rotation are smaller than those
associated with retooling or scrapping capital. In the absence of distortions, producers
would rather respond to shocks through the adjustment of labor, as the more variable
factor, as opposed to through the adjustment of ﬁxed capital. In fact, the adjustment
function of capital after the Colombian reforms closely mimics those estimated for the
U.S., suggesting that the Colombian capital adjustments may now be driven much more
by technological and less by institutional factors as in the U.S.
If factor reallocation facilitates the expansion of more eﬃcient incumbents and the con-
traction of less eﬃcient plants, then we may expect market reforms to be associated with
productivity growth. We, thus, explore whether the changes in employment and capital
adjustments after the Colombian reforms were productivity-enhancing and whether the hy-
pothetical move to a completely frictionless world in factor markets would be productivity-
enhancing. We ﬁnd that moving towards frictionless factor adjustment would indeed in-
crease productivity substantially (by more than 20 log points in any given year) by allowing
the reallocation of activity from low towards high productivity plants. We also ﬁnd sub-
stantial improvements in allocative eﬃciency in Colombia over the reform period. However,
in spite of the potential for reductions in factor adjustment costs, our counterfactual analy-
sis shows that not much of the actual improvement in allocative eﬃciency is due to the
reductions in factor adjustment costs. Apparently, other aspects of the reforms yielded
improvements in allocative eﬃciency. Note, however, that our ﬁndings show there is still
substantial room for improvements in allocative eﬃciency from reductions in factor adjust-
ment costs.
While our results suggest that the reforms generated eﬃciency gains, it is also important
to note that the much greater adjustment in response to labor surpluses after the reforms
may have also impacted the dynamics of unemployment in terms of inﬂows, outﬂows and the
duration of unemployment. Assessing the impact on unemployment dynamics including
the impact on workers is part of our intended future research.
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Figure 3: Estimated Employment Adjustment Function and Distribution of Employment Shortages,
































































Figure 4: Estimated Capital Adjustment Function and Distribution of Capital Shortages,

















































































































Cross: actual Cross: frictionless Cross: projected Cross: L-adjustment without reform Cross: K-adjustment without reform Simple Average
 
 Table 1: Output Weighted Descriptive Statistics,  
Before and After Reforms 
 
 
Variable Pre-Reforms  Post-Reforms 
 




















































    
N 37,518  33,352 
    
      
 
Notes:  This table reports means and standard deviations of the log of quantities, of the log of real wages, and 
of log prices deviated from yearly producer price indices (in logs). It also reports the first two  moments of 
labor and capital shortages estimated using equations (1) and (2). All statistics are weighted by output. The 
pre-reform period includes the years 1982-1990, while the post-reform period includes the years 1991-1998. 
The sample has been restricted to observations for which both labor and capital shortages could be calculated.   
 Table 2: Labor and Capital Adjustment Functions 
EMPLOYMENT CAPITAL 
(1) 
Notes:  The table reports partial and non linear adjustment functions estimated using equation system (3), where estimation of  the labor adjustment and capital adjustment functions weigh observations according, respectively, 
to the fraction of total employment and capital represented by the plant.  The labor and capital shortages are estimated using equation (1).  The sample is a panel of pairwise continuining plants.  The positive shortage dummy 
takes the value of 1 when there is a shortage in the corresponding factor and the value of 0 when there is a surplus.  The post-reform dummy takes the value of 1 for years 1991-98 and the the value of 0 for years 1983-90. 
Column (1) and Column (7) show results for the Partial Adjustment Model. Column (2) and Column (8) show results for the Partial Adjustment Model with coefficients that vary pre- and post-reform. Column (3) and Column 
(9) exhibit the non linear adjustment model. Column (4) and Column (10) exhibit the non linear model with coefficients that vary pre- and post-reform. FInally, Column (5) and Column (11) show the non-linear adjustment 
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       -0.0326 
(0.0077) 




       -0.0150 
(0.0119) 
    -0.1632 
(0.0103) 
 -0.1490  K Shortage²  
(0.0107)  × Pos. Sh. × Post 
L Shortage 
× K Sh. × Post 
       -0.0265 
(0.0085) 
              0.0630 
  (0.0146) 
L Sh. × K Sh. 
× Pos. Sh. × Post 
       0.1008 
(0.0144) 
        -0.0929 
  (0.0181) 
   410.05  95.00  33.59  58.64      1560.05  89.81  205.69  74.93  F-test additional terms     [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]    [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
Adjusted  R2  0.1799  0.1831 0.1958 0.2006 0.1975 0.2034 0.2093 0.2202 0.2647 0.2689 0.2743 0.2812 
N 70,870  70,870  70,870  70,870  70,870 70,870 70,870 70,870 70,870 70,870 70,870 70,870 Methodological Web Appendix to
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Panel Evidence from Colombian Plants”
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Methodological Web Appendix
This Methodological Appendix accompanies Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and
Kugler (2008). It reports details on the methodology used to calculate frictionless
factor demands. It also shows the diﬀerent tests used to explore the robustness of
t h eb a s e l i n er e s u l t st oc h a n g e si ns o m ea s s u m p t i o n s .
1 First-order Conditions of Proﬁt Maximization
Problem
This section reports the system of ﬁve equations characterizing frictionless factor
demands, which results from the ﬁrst order conditions of the proﬁt maximization




















is a measure of the “proﬁtability shocks” received by the ﬁrm. It can be recovered
(in log form) from:
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α e Kjt + β e Hjt + βe Ljt + γ e Ejt + φf Mjt
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we obtain that the system of ﬁve ﬁrst-order conditions of the proﬁt maximization
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Our baseline results use the above system of ﬁve equations to calculate the initial
solution of the frictionless demands of all factors. Given the availability of plant-
level prices, we can create measures of physical productivity and demand shocks. We
use these measures to estimate the proﬁtability shock e Sjt directly from (the log of)
equation (1). Estimates of the cost shocks and the technology and demand parameters
are also necessary to estimate e Sjt, and these measures are generated as described in
the text of the main paper. Using the fundamental parameters and shocks, estimated
as described in the text of the main paper, and our estimate of e Sjt, we solve the above
system numerically for each plant-year observation.
In the next step, we take advantage of the relationship between the solutions for
the variable factors (materials, energy, and hours, not subject to adjustment costs)
in the frictionless system above and the same variable factors in the “actual” proﬁt
maximization when capital and labor are subject to adjustment costs. The ﬁrst
order conditions for materials, energy and hours are just static ﬁrst order conditions
2regardless, although the solution diﬀers depending on whether capital and labor are
frictionless as well or are subject to adjustment costs. Note further that in principle
the solution for materials, energy and hours in the case where capital and labor are
subject to adjustment costs should be equal to the observed values in the plant-level
data and we exploit this in this second step.
With some manipulation of the ﬁrst order conditions, the following identities
emerge (where we denote the frictionless solution from the above system with an




























w h e r ew ed e n o t et h ep l a n t - l e v e lr e v e n u et h a tw o u l db ei m p l i e db yt h er e v e n u ef u n c t i o n
evaluated at the levels of factors implied by the frictionless solution, as Λjt and
the actual revenue values consistent with the presence of adjustment costs with a















, as implied by equation (8). Observe that these latter identities are
such that the frictionless variable factors can be solved for recursively. Once we have
one of the frictionless variable factors solved for we can solve for the others using the
above equations.
We use these identities in this second stage of estimation as follows. We calculate
Mjt from equation (8), where Λjt corresponds to the revenue function evaluated at the
levels of factors obtained in the initial frictionless solution. We then compute a plant-
speciﬁc constant proportional correction factor, and use it to obtain the measure of
Mjt we use in the analysis. With Mjt and the second set of identities listed above,
we recursively obtain Ejt and Hjt.
Our plant-speciﬁc proportional correction factor for materials is chosen so that
frictionless and actual materials are at the same level in at least one period (the
period when materials is at its median growth). We use materials to generate the
correction factor since, given the availability of plant-level prices for materials, mate-
rials is likely the most accurately measured of the variable factors, besides exhibiting
a high cost share. In considering the need for such a correction factor, note that the
frictionless revenue (and frictionless factors) estimates from the ﬁrst stage will reﬂect
any measurement error in the estimated parameters and shocks to technology, costs
and demand. Since such measurement error may have a plant speciﬁc level eﬀect (i.e.,
is not mean zero at the plant-level), the measurement error may imply that friction-
less revenue estimated in the ﬁr s ts t e pm a yb et o oh i g ho rt o ol o wi nt e r m so fl e v e l s
relative to actual revenue (which reﬂects the adjustment costs for capital and labor).
As such, our benchmarking of materials is intended to benchmark the ratio of actual
t of r i c t i o n l e s sr e v e n u ea tt h ep l a n tl e v e l . N o t et h a to n c ew eb e n c h m a r km a t e r i a l s ,
the recursive nature of the solution for the other variable factors implies they will be
3benchmarked accordingly as well. We have explored alternatives to this procedure
in terms of the number of periods we force the identity to hold for materials and the
results are robust to alternatives. It is also important to note that the impact of the
multiple steps including this correction factor is modest — for example, the correlation
between the frictionless materials estimated in the ﬁrst step and our ﬁnal estimate of
frictionless materials is 0.99. Recall further that the other frictionless factors (hours
a n de n e r g y )a r ee s t i m a t e dt os a t i s f yt h ea b o v ei d e n t i t i e so n c ew eh a v eam e a s u r eo f
frictionless materials.
2 Experiments with Alternative Assumptions
This section reports results of alternative exercises, each of which changes part of
the assumptions or the methodology used to obtain the baseline results reported in
Eslava et al. (2008).
2.1 Sector level prices
Our baseline results use plant-level prices as deﬂators for output, materials, and
energy. Plant-level prices for materials and energy are also used in the calculation of
frictionless factor demands, as they appear in the ﬁrst-order conditions of the proﬁt
maximization problem. To investigate the potential gains of having access to plant-
level prices, we re-estimate adjustment functions using sector-level prices for output,
energy, and materials. Note that in the absence of plant-level prices we are unable
to adequately separate physical productivity from demand shocks, so in the system
of ﬁve ﬁrst-order conditions reported above we rather use a composite proﬁtability
shock, e Sjt. We estimate this shock as a residual from the revenue function (2), where
factor elasticities are the aggregate cost shares, and where the elasticity of demand is
set exogenously to -2. This demand elasticity is close to our estimate for the baseline
case (see also Eslava et al., 2004).
Results using sector-level prices are reported in Figures 1.a and 2.a. Comparing
these ﬁgures with the baseline results in the paper, which use plant-level prices,
suggests that using sector-level prices introduces substantial measurement error. In
Figure 2.a, the adjustment hazard is negative for a wide range of relevant capital
surpluses relatively close to zero. A negative adjustment hazard is an indication of
mismeasurement of surpluses as this would imply that a plant that wishes to reduce its
capital stock actually increases it. Other aspects of the adjustment hazards also look
anomalous. We ﬁnd that for both labor and capital shortages that the post-reform
hazards are lower than the pre-reform hazards. While the impact of the reform is
an empirical question, a ﬁnding going in the opposite direction from predicted eﬀects
and also in the opposite direction from what we ﬁnd for the baseline results is another
indication of measurement error. In this case, the lack of plant-level data would yield
quite misleading inferences about the impact of the reforms on adjustment.
42.2 Alternative Measures of Frictionless/Desired Plant-level
Constants
Desired and frictionless factor demands are assumed to relate to each other as follows:
L
∗




where Ljt and Kjt are the frictionless demands of employment and capital, L∗
jt and
K∗
jt are the corresponding desired demands, and θLj and θKj are plant-speciﬁce m -
ployment and capital constants. In the baseline estimation reported in Eslava et al.
(2008) these constants are calculated as ratios between the actual and the friction-
less employment and capital levels for the year in which the plant is at its median
employment growth and investment, respectively. To explore the robustness of our
results to this choice of plant-speciﬁc constants, we produce results using an alterna-
tive deﬁnition of θLj and θKj. In particular, we calculate these constants as ratios
between the actual and the frictionless employment and capital levels for the three
years in which the plant is closest to its median employment growth and investment,
when the plant is in the sample for more than ten years. For plants that are in the
sample for ten years or less, we use the same deﬁnition of these constants used for
the baseline estimation. Results of this alternative exercise are reported in Figures
1.b and 2.b. No important diﬀerences arise with respect to the baseline case. We
chose to keep the baseline case rather than this alternative, since it treats long-lived
and short-lived plants symmetrically.
2.3 Alternative Estimates of Factor Elasticities
The baseline results estimate factor elasticities as aggregate (at the manufacturing
sector) cost shares. We have also re-estimated our results using sector-level cost
s h a r e s . N o t et h a tt h i sc h a n g em a y ,i np r i n c i p l e ,a ﬀect the factor elasticities them-
selves, the resulting measure of TFP, and the demand estimation, as TFP is used as
an instrument in this estimation. In practice, we obtain virtually identical results,
as reported in Figures 1.c and 2.c. We chose to use the aggregate elasticities since
this permitted us to compare this case to other alternatives. For example, we have
also produced another set of results using the IV-based factor elasticities proposed in
Eslava et al. (2004).1 Results are reported in Figure 1.d and 2.d. The basic patterns
of the eﬀects of reforms also hold when we allow elasticities to vary by sector, although
some diﬀerences with our baseline results can be observed. Adjustment functions are
1These IV-based elasticities can only be estimated at the aggregate level, given the limited
variability of some of the instruments. Our baseline case uses aggregate cost shares precisely to be
able to compare to results obtained using the IV-based elasticities.
5generally ﬂatter in this version, and the hazard of adjustment for capital turns out
negative in part of the relevant range of capital surpluses. As mentioned above, this
negative hazard suggests greater measurement error with this set of factor elasticities,
compared to our baseline estimation.
2.4 Alternative Measures of User Cost of Capital
The baseline estimation of frictionless factor demands imposes an exogenous value
for the user cost of capital of Rt =0 .15, based on previous estimates for Colombia.
However, a frictionless environment may imply a lower user cost of capital. We
reproduced our results using Rt =0 .08 with almost identical results, as reported in
Figures 1.e and 2.e.
One could also think that reforms aﬀected factor adjustment through an eﬀect
in the user cost of capital. To explore this possibility, we set the user cost of cap-
ital equal to the (ex-post) real interest rate (Figures 1.f and 2.f.). The shapes of
the adjustment functions and the eﬀects of the reforms are similar to those obtained
for the baseline case, suggesting our baseline estimation is not missing the eﬀects of
reforms by assuming a constant user cost of capital. However, there is evidence of
greater measurement error when we use the real interest rate: part of the adjust-
ment functions display negative adjustment hazards and decreasing shapes. This is
probably not surprising given the well-known problems of the ex-post interest rates
to approximate the user cost of capital. Since, to our knowledge, there is no reliable
estimation of the ex ante user cost of capital for Colombia for our period of study (at
least not one that varies over time), we prefer keeping a constant value of Rt as our
baseline assumption. Note that Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) also use a
constant value of the interest rate for similar reasons for the U.S.
2.5 Alternative Parameterization of Wage Function
Our baseline case assumes δ =2 , based on estimates for the US. We examine the
robustness of our results to changes in the value of δ. Figures 1.g and 2.g. show the
results when we assume δ =3 . Results do not show important changes.
2.6 Balanced Panel
Our baseline results are estimated including all plants present in t − 1, t,a n dt +1
(pairwise continuers). We re-estimate those results restricting our sample to the
balanced panel. Results are reported in Figures 1.h and 2.h. These results are similar
to those obtained for the whole sample of pairwise continuers, except that plants in
the balanced sample display more pronounced non-linearities.
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